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INTRODUCTION
In its current yet to be ratified form,1 the Anti-Counterfeiting
Trade Agreement (“ACTA”), negotiated under general secrecy
among a self-selected group of countries,2 proposes to allow
* Professor, Northeastern University School of Law; Honorary Research
Fellow, University of KwaZulu Natal; Health GAP Policy Analyst.
1. Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, Dec. 3, 2010 [hereinafter ACTA
Text―Dec. 3, 2010], available at http://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/acta/Final-ACTAtext-following-legal-verification.pdf. The ACTA text has undergone a series of
revisions as it approached finalization. The most current version, dated December
3, 2010, is the result of final textual scrubbing following legal verification. An
earlier version, subtitled “Subject to Legal Review,” was dated November 15,
2010. See Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement: Subject to Legal Review, Nov.
15, 2010 [hereinafter ACTA Draft―Nov. 15, 2010], available at
http://www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/2379. The first quasi-official text was titled
“Consolidated
Text—Anti-Counterfeiting
Trade
Agreement,
Informal
Predecisional/ Deliberative Draft.” See Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement:
Informal Predecisional/Deliberative Draft, Oct. 2, 2010 [hereinafter ACTA
Draft―Oct. 2, 2010], available at http://www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/2338
(reflecting changes made during the September 2010 Tokyo Round, which
included changes to both Section 3 and Section 5 of Chapter 2).
2. See Eddan Katz & Gwen Hinze, The Impact of the Anti-Counterfeiting
Trade Agreement on the Knowledge Economy: The Accountability of the Office of
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preliminary and final injunctive relief against third parties (“thirdparty enforcement”) to prevent infringement of intellectual property
(“IP”) rights and/or to prevent infringing goods from entering into
the channels of commerce.3 After a behind-the-scenes battle, the
relevant civil enforcement and injunction section of ACTA no longer
applies automatically to the entire range of IP rights4 covered by the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(“TRIPS Agreement”),5 but rather permits parties to exclude patents
and undisclosed data,6 as proposed by the U.S.7 Similarly and more
effectively, there is an absolute exclusion of patents from the border
enforcement section.8 Even though patents may be excluded from
civil enforcement measures and are definitely excluded from border
measures, the health risks in ACTA have not been eliminated. In the
context of access to medicines, new globalized forms of third-party
enforcement, like its draft predecessor, intermediary service provider

the U.S. Trade Representative for the Creation of IP Enforcement Norms Through
Executive Trade Agreements, 35 YALE J. INT’L L. ONLINE 24, 26-27 (2009),
http://www.yjil.org/docs/pub/o-35-katz-hinze-ACTA-on-knowledge-economy.pdf
(stating “[o]n October 23, 2007, the United States, the European Community,
Switzerland and Japan simultaneously announced” that they would negotiate a new
intellectual property enforcement treaty). Australia, the Republic of Korea, New
Zealand, Mexico, Jordan, Morocco, Singapore, and Canada have joined the
negotiations. Id.
3. See ACTA Text―Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 1, arts. 8, 12; infra Part I.
4. See ACTA Draft―Oct. 2, 2010, supra note 1, art. 1.X (indicating
“intellectual property means all categories of intellectual property that are the
subject of Sections 1 though 7 of Part II of the Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights”). Those sections cover: copyrights and
related rights, trademarks, geographical indications, industrial designs, patents,
layouts (topographies) of integrated circuits, and protection of undisclosed
information. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 1C, pts. II:1-7, 108 Stat. 4809, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299
[hereinafter TRIPS].
5. TRIPS pt. II.
6. See ACTA Text―Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 1, art. 7 n.2 (“A Party may
exclude patents and protection of undisclosed information from the scope of this
Section.”) (emphasis added).
7. See ACTA Draft―Oct. 2, 2010, supra note 1, art. 2.1 n.2 (noting the
United States chose to exclude patents from Section 2).
8. See ACTA Text―Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 1, art. 13 n.6 (stating “the
Parties agree that patents and protection of undisclosed information do not fall
within the scope” of the Border Measures section) (emphasis added).
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enforcement,9 poses unprecedented risks to the lawful trade of
generic medicines. Extending third-party enforcement and imposing
provisional measures and permanent injunctions could interfere with
the goals of robust generic competition and access to medicine when
applied against (1) innocent active pharmaceutical ingredient
(“API”) suppliers whose materials are used in the manufacturing of
patent infringing medicines or in mislabeled products without their
knowledge, (2) transporters who use international channels of
commerce through countries where the “patent manufacturing
fiction” or “trademark confusion” claims might apply, and (3) other
actors in the global procurement, supply, and even registration of
medicines. Under the risk of injunctions and contempt of court
penalties, API and other suppliers would predictably shy away from
selling base ingredients to generic producers. Likewise, entities like
the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (“Global
Fund”) and the U.S. PEPFAR Supply Chain Management System
(“SCMS”) could be deterred from funding the purchase of generic
medicines, and shippers might refuse to transport finished generic
medicines through ordinary transshipment routes involving ACTA
signatories. These threats to access to medicines remain to be
addressed by a global coalition of AIDS, health, and trade activists.

I. ACTA’S KEY PROVISIONS: MOVEMENT FROM
INTERMEDIARY TO THIRD-PARTY
ENFORCEMENT
The Public Predecisional/Deliberative Draft of the AntiCounterfeiting Trade Agreement, dated April 2010 (“April
Predecisional Draft”),10 contained multiple threats to access to
medicines. The most widely discussed issue involved the seizure of
goods-in-transit following the detention of multiple drug shipments
by Dutch customs authorities in 2008 and 2009,11 under the authority
9. The concept of intermediary service provider, discussed further, infra Part I,
applies not to entities that directly infringe IP rights but rather those entities that
provide services that contributed to the creation and distribution of an IP infringing
product.
10. Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement: PUBLIC Predecisional/Deliberative
Draft, Apr. 21, 2010 [hereinafter ACTA Draft―Apr. 21, 2010], available at
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2010/april/tradoc_146029.pdf.
11. See EC Customs Law, TPA CUSTOMS NEWSLETTER (TPA Global,
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of Council Regulation (EC) No. 1383/2003.12 Dutch authorities
applied the judicially-created rule that the IP status of in-transit
medicines should be judged under the fiction that the medicines had
been manufactured in the Netherlands.13 The authorities thus
responded to Big Pharma seizure requests by impounding and
delaying shipments of life-saving medicines sent from India, where
they had been lawfully manufactured and exported, to countries in
Africa and Latin America, where they would have been lawfully
imported, marketed, and consumed. These seizures and the European
Union’s delayed and defensive response to expressions of diplomatic
and human rights concern prompted India and Brazil to initiate
dispute resolution procedures at the World Trade Organization.14
Amsterdam, Neth.), Nov. 2009, at 2, available at http://www.tpa-global.com/
PDF/Publications/011109_TPA-Customs_Newsletter.pdf
(summarizing
an
incident on December 4, 2008, where Dutch authorities seized an air shipment of
generic medicine on suspicion that it was counterfeit, and held it for thirty-six
days).
12. See Council Regulation 1383/2003, 2003 O.J. (L 196) 7 (EC) (outlining a
policy in the European Union that customs action can be taken against goods that
are suspected of violating intellectual property rights).
13. The fiction that the product was manufactured in the Netherlands, despite
having been actually produced elsewhere, permits Dutch authorities to apply and
enforce a product’s territorial patent status in the Netherlands despite the fact that
the product is not intended for commercialization there. See Frederick M. Abbott,
Seizure of Generic Pharmaceuticals in Transit Based on Allegations of Patent
Infringement: A Threat to International Trade, Development and Public Welfare, 1
WIPO J. 43, 43 (2009) (noting that the European Union’s amended border control
regulations gave permission to E.U. patent holders to demand seizure of goods
such as medicines in transit); cf. Sosecal v. Sisvel, Rechtbanks-Gravenhage
[District Court in The Hague], July 18, 2008, 311378/KG ZA 08-617 (Neth.)
(discussing the manufacturing fiction with regard to a shipment of MP4 players);
Frank Eijsvogels, Sisel v. Sosecal: Acting Against Transit Goods Still Possible
Under the Anti Piracy Regulation in the Netherlands, IP INTELLIGENCE EUR.
(Howrey L.L.P., Amsterdam, Neth.), Autumn 2008, at 10 (stating that under Sisvel,
transit goods may be detained as may be goods intended for the country that serves
as their point of entry into the European Union).
14. See Dispute Settlement: Dispute DS408, European Union and a Member
State [India] -- Seizure of Generic Drugs in Transit, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds408_e.htm (last updated
June 22, 2010) (relaying the initiation of consultations by India with the European
Union and the Netherlands regarding repeated seizures on the basis of patent
infringement); Dispute Settlement: Dispute DS409, European Union and a
Member State [Brazil] -- Seizure of Generic Drugs in Transit, WORLD TRADE
ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds409 _e.htm (last
updated June 22, 2010) (reporting that Brazil requested consultations with the
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Unfortunately, the risks of the April Predecisional Draft to public
health and to the lawful international trade of generic medicines were
not limited to border-seizures by customs agents policing phantom
patent rights. A risk also arose from provisions that subjected socalled “intermediaries” to interlocutory and permanent injunctions,
known elsewhere as interdicts. The use of such injunctions against
API manufacturers, international shippers, and other participants in
the global trade of medicines could inhibit supply and distribution
systems and thereby deter generic entry, robust generic competition,
and legitimate international trade of generic medicines of assured
quality, especially if the civil enforcement provisions were to extend
to all IP rights as proposed by some negotiators, including the
European Community.15
Bracketed Article 2.X.2 provided: “The Parties [may] shall ensure
that right holders are in a position to apply for an injunction against
[infringing] intermediaries whose services are used by a third party
to infringe an intellectual property right.”16 Footnote 8 stated that the
“conditions and procedures relating to such injunction will be left to
each Party’s legal system.”17 Similarly, bracketed Article 2.5.X
provided that “[a]n interlocutory injunction may also be issued,
under the same conditions {to prevent any imminent infringement of
an intellectual property right}, against any [infringing] intermediary
whose services are being used by a third party to infringe an
intellectual property right.”18 The parties left undecided whether the
provision of injunctions against intermediaries would be mandatory
European Union regarding the repeated seizure of generic drugs originating in
India); see also India, Brazil Raise Dispute Over EU Drug Seizures, SUNS, May
17, 2010, available at http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/wto.info/2010/twninfo
100509.htm; Kaitlin Mara, Consultations on WTO Drug Transit Case Continue,
INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Sept. 16, 2010, 7:23 PM), http://www.ip-watch.org/
weblog/2010/09/16/consultations-on-wtocase-on-drugs-in-transit-continue/; C.H.
Unnikrishnan, India May Move WTO as It Seeks to Resolve EU Dispute, LIVEMINT
(Oct. 11, 2010, 10:54 PM), http://www.livemint.com/2010/10/1122 5420/Indiamay-move-WTO-as-it-seeks.html.
15. See ACTA Draft―Apr. 21, 2010, supra note 10, art. 2.1 (containing
alternative coverage proposals revealing a disagreement over whether the section
should apply to all intellectual property rights, or only copyrights and related rights
and trademarks).
16. Id. art. 2.X.2.
17. Id. art. 2.X n.8.
18. Id. art. 2.5.X.
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or permissive. In either event, there would have been an in terrorem
effect. A related concept to intermediary enforcement was the
proposed criminal responsibility of persons or entities that incite, aid,
or abet cases of willful trademark counterfeiting or copyright or
related rights piracy on a commercial scale.19 Enforcement against
intermediaries would have been facilitated by proposed Article 2.4,
which allowed broad discovery of intermediary activities,
particularly those involving production and distribution, during civil
enforcement procedures against alleged infringers.20
The April Predecisional Draft left undefined the key operative
term, “intermediaries,” as well as the alternative term, “infringing
intermediary.” Likewise, what constituted “services” used by another
to infringe an IP right was also unclear. Previously, the concept
“intermediary services” had been analyzed most closely with respect
to internet service providers (“ISPs”).21 In those circumstances, an
ISP that merely provided facilities used by others for infringement,
i.e. to download a digital copy of a song, book or movie, might be
19. Id. art. 2.15.2.
20. Id. art. 2.4.
Without prejudice to other statutory provisions which, in particular, govern the
protection of confidentiality of information sources or the processing of personal data,
Each Party shall provide that in civil judicial proceedings concerning the enforcement
of [intellectual property rights and copyright or related rights and trademarks], its
judicial authorities shall have the authority upon a justified request of the right holder,
to order the [alleged] infringer [including an alleged infringer] to provide, [for the
purpose of collecting evidence] any [relevant] information [information on the origin
and distribution network of the infringing goods or services][in the form as prescribed
in its applicable laws and regulations] that the infringer possesses or controls, [where
appropriate,] to the right holder or to the judicial authorities. Such information may
include information regarding any person or persons involved in any aspect of the
infringement and regarding the means of production or distribution channel of such
goods or services, including the identification of third persons involved in the
production and distribution of the infringing goods or services or in their channels of
distribution. [For greater clarity, this provision does not apply to the extent that it
would conflict with common law or statutory privileges, such as legal professional
privilege].

Id.
21. ACTA Ultra-Lite: The U.S. Cave on the Internet Chapter Complete,
MICHAEL GEIST BLOG (Oct. 6, 2010), http://www.michaelgeist.ca/content/view/
5352/125/ (noting these concerns have not been completely eliminated in the new
ACTA text in part because the United States, who was initially in favor of tough
liability provisions for intermediaries, decided only recently to “cave” on their
insistence of such provisions).
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interdicted. Given the lack of definition, access-to-knowledge
activists were concerned that the terms “intermediaries” or
“infringing intermediaries” might not only be applied to ISPs but
might also be extended to libraries, cultural institutions, and
educational institutions. However, their application to mail or
telecommunications providers had been deemed unlikely.22 Internet
and copyright activists were also concerned that providing for
injunctions might create incentives for ISPs and other intermediaries
to take on new roles as extra-judicial enforcement arms of the courts
and, most especially, of rights holders.
In part because of health activist concern over the impact of
intermediary enforcement on access to medicines and because of a
lack of clarity about the territorial reach of injunctive powers,23 the
parties dropped the intermediary language in the first quasi-official
text, the Consolidated Text—Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement,
Informal Predecisional/ Deliberative Draft, dated October 2, 2010,24
and instead introduced the concept of third-party enforcement in its
place. Pursuant to the revised Civil Enforcement—Provisional
Measures section:

22. See Kimberlee Weatherall, The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement:
Analysis of the January Consolidated Text 18 (Apr. 2010), available at
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1019&context=kimweathera
ll (suggesting that it would be utterly unprecedented to apply the terms
“intermediaries” or “infringing intermediaries” to mail service and
telecommunications companies).
23. See Text of Urgent ACTA Communique: International Experts Find that
Pending Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement Threatens Public Interests, AM. U.
WASH. C. L. PROGRAM ON INFO. JUST. & INTELL. PROP. (Jun. 23, 2010),
http://www.wcl.american.edu/pijip/go/acta-communique (identifying the threat to
access to medicines by the intermediary liability language of the April
Predecisional Draft of ACTA, which included expanding the scope of the
agreement to include patents and limiting key flexibilities on injunctions); see also
ACTA - People Before Profits!, AVAAZ, http://www.avaaz.org/en/acta (last visited
Mar. 1, 2011) (calling for transparency in the ACTA negotiations spurred by
mounting concern over denial of access to life-saving generic medicines); Berkeley
Declaration on Intellectual Property Enforcement and Access to Medicines,
BERKELEY L. SCH. (Jul. 15, 2010), http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/
Berkeley_Declaration.pdf (discussing the negative impact ACTA would have on
the supply of generic medicines and emphasizing that restricting generic medicines
disrupts competition and makes it difficult for those with limited resources to
access important medicines).
24. ACTA Draft―Oct. 2, 2010, supra note 1.
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Each Party shall provide that its judicial authorities shall have the
authority to order prompt and effective provisional measures: against a
party, or where appropriate, against a third party over whom the relevant
judicial authority exercises jurisdiction, to prevent an infringement of any
intellectual property rights from occurring, and in particular to prevent
infringing goods from entering into the channels of commerce.25

Likewise, with respect to its Civil Enforcement Injunctions
section:
Each Party shall provide that, in civil judicial proceedings concerning the
enforcement of intellectual property rights, its judicial authorities shall
have the authority to issue an order against a party to desist from an
infringement, and inter alia, an order to that party or, where appropriate,
to a third party over whom the relevant judicial authority exercises
jurisdiction, to prevent infringing goods from entering into the channels
of commerce.26

This language concerning third-party enforcement was present in
the penultimate draft27 and final ACTA text.28
Adoption of third-party enforcement exceeds TRIPS protocol, or
is “TRIPS-plus,” because no comparable provisions in TRIPS
addresses injunctions for established violations and provisional
measures for threatened infringements.29 Under TRIPS Article 44,
members are not obligated to allow for injunctions against persons
who acquire or order protected subject matter without having known
or having had reason to know that they were dealing in infringing
products.30 However, there is an obligation under TRIPS Article 47
to provide information about “the identity of third persons involved
in the production and distribution of the infringing goods or services
and of their channels of distribution.”31 Article 50 permits
provisional measures to prevent the infringement of IP rights and to
25. Id. art. 2.5(1)(a) (emphasis added).
26. Id. art. 2.X.1 (emphasis added).
27. ACTA Draft―Nov. 15, 2010, supra note 1, arts. 2.5:1(a), 2.X.1.
28. ACTA Text―Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 1, arts. 12:1(a), 8:1.
29. See TRIPS arts. 44, 50.
30. See id. art. 44.1 (“Members are not obligated to accord such authority in
respect of protected subject matter acquired or ordered by a person prior to
knowing or having reasonable grounds to know that dealing in such subject matter
would entail the infringement of an intellectual property right.”).
31. Id. art. 47.
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prevent the entry of infringing products, but like Article 44, it does
not directly address enforcement against third parties.32
The necessity of having personal and territorial jurisdiction over a
third party is at least referenced by the final ACTA text,33 but ACTA
introduced an additional confusing phrase―“entering into the
channels of commerce.” TRIPS had previously referenced “channels
of commerce” in its enforcement provisions, but clarified the concept
considerably by limiting it to goods that had entered commercial
channels within the territory of the enforcing country.34 By now
extending this concept beyond such territory, ACTA is not only
TRIPS-plus, but it also introduces substantial ambiguity about the
length, depth, and width of the channels of commerce.35
32. See id. art. 50 (failing to directly address third parties in the “Provisional
Measures” article).
33. See ACTA Text―Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 1, arts. 12:1(a). Injunctions are
usually limited in their application to activities occurring within the geographic
territory of the issuing jurisdiction, but jurisdiction sometimes extends to
extraterritorial activities that adversely impact in-territory interests. Under a strict
territorial rule, to enjoin third-party enablement of IP infringement in India, first
the third party would have to be facilitating an infringement of a territorial IP right
in India, and second, the injunction would have to be issued in India against the
importation, manufacturing, or export of the third-party-provided service or
materials. However, if more expansive extra-territorial jurisdiction applied, the
transit country could issue an injunction against the third party’s activities in other
countries to the extent that those activities had or would predictably impact interritory events. In such circumstances, a third party might be enjoined in the
Netherlands for supplying APIs to an infringing generic manufacturer in India that
had or intended to transship through the Netherlands. See AM. L. INST.,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PRINCIPLES GOVERNING JURISDICTION, CHOICE OF LAW,
AND JUDGMENTS IN TRANSNATIONAL DISPUTES (2008). A full discussion of
extraterritorial jurisdiction is clearly beyond the scope of this short article, but for a
discussion of some of the relevant principles, see generally id.
34. See TRIPS art. 44(1) (“The judicial authorities shall have the authority to
order a party to desist from an infringement . . . to prevent the entry into the
channels of commerce in their jurisdiction of imported goods that involve the
infringement of an intellectual property right, immediately after customs clearance
of such goods.”).
The judicial authorities shall have the authority to order prompt and effective
provisional measures: (a) to prevent an infringement of any intellectual property right
from occurring, and in particular to prevent the entry into the channels of commerce in
their jurisdiction of goods, including imported goods immediately after customs
clearance.

Id. art. 50(1)(a).
35. See infra Part II (describing the risk faced by distributors and transporters
of generic medicine due to the ambiguity of ACTA’s third-party enforcement
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An additional incoherence in the ACTA text is that provisional
measures can be used to address any IP infringement but final
injunctions are limited solely to preventing infringing goods from
entering into channels of commerce. Paradoxically, provisional
measures might be used to temporarily enjoin production, before full
commercialization, but final injunctions might not be able do so.36
In service of third-party enforcement, all the relevant drafts of
ACTA have required production of information “regarding any
person involved in any aspect of the infringement . . . and regarding
the means of production or the channels of distribution of the
infringing or allegedly infringing goods or services.”37 This language
is in substantial conformity with TRIPS.38 With respect to criminal
enforcement, the parties modified the April Predecisional Draft
provision to exclude incitement and instead require that each “[p]arty
shall ensure that criminal liability for aiding and abetting is available
under its law.”39
Although the final ACTA text clearly elected to focus IP
enforcement on third parties rather than intermediary service
providers, the next section addresses both concepts because of the
dangers each poses to access to medicines.

II. APPLYING INTERMEDIARY AND NOW THIRDPARTY ENFORCEMENT TO PHARMACEUTICALS
In the context of access to medicines, the concept “intermediary
services” may be quite ominous. Services are obviously provided by
ISPs―allowing suppliers to market medicines online―and, in the
pharmaceutical context, by shipping agents.40 However, lawyers and
accountants, communications service providers, and factory workers
concept).
36. ACTA Text―Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 1, arts. 8, 12 (providing, in Article
12, that provisional measures may be taken against a party or third party to prevent
an infringement of any intellectual property right, including to prevent goods from
entering channels of commerce, while Article 8 provides for final injunctions
against any goods that infringe upon intellectual property rights from entering into
the channels of commerce).
37. E.g., id. art. 11.
38. See TRIPS art. 47 (allowing judicial authorities “to order the infringer to
inform the right holder of the identity of third persons involved in the production
and distribution of infringing goods or services”).
39. ACTA Text―Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 1, art. 23.4.
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also supply services. Although one does not usually consider
suppliers of components—for example, API and inert ingredient
suppliers—to be providing a “service,” if components are deemed to
be services, then all medicine component suppliers could be deemed
“intermediaries” who contributed services instantiated in the
manufacture and distribution of an IP-infringing generic medicine,
and would therefore be subject to an injunction and perhaps even an
order of destruction.41
Perhaps more ominously, many others who helped fund or
facilitate purchases of generic drugs as they moved through the
stream of international commerce from producer to consumer could
face intermediary liability. For example, the Global Fund solicits and
funds country-led proposals for funding priority disease prevention,
treatment, and care.42 More to the point, the Global Fund now
provides a voluntary pooled-procurement service for medicines43 and
40. See Thomas Schachl, German Federal Supreme Court Confirms Broad
Responsibility of Forwarding Agents for Handled Goods; Increased Requirements
to Examine Compliance of Handled Goods With German Patent Law, BARDEHLE
PAGENBERG IP REP. (Düsseldorf, Ger.), 2010/I, at 6, available at
http://www.bardehle.com/uploads/files/IP_Report_2010_I.pdf (summarizing a
German Court ruling granting injunctive relief against a shipping agent who
delivered allegedly patent infringing MP3 players); see also Trade Enforcement
Act of 2009, S. 1466, 111th Cong. § 223(2)(C)-(D) (2009) (providing for
disclosure of identities and contact information of parties involved in shipments of
infringing goods); Customs Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Reauthorization
Act of 2009, S. 1631, 111th Cong. § 234(a)-(d) (2009) (supporting the inference
that the enforcement agenda seeks to disrupt each and every link in the distribution
chain); ACTA Draft―Apr. 21, 2010, supra note 10, art. 2.4 (allowing
intermediary liability to extend to shippers by including a direct reference to
distribution and channels of distribution).
41. See ACTA Text―Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 1, art. 10(2) (arguably
permitting the destruction of APIs used in the “manufacture” of “infringing”
generic medicines).
Each Party shall further provide that its judicial authorities have the authority to order
that materials and implements, the predominant use of which has been in the
manufacture or creation of such infringing goods, be, without undue delay and without
compensation of any sort, destroyed or disposed of outside the channels of commerce
in such a manner as to minimize the risks of further infringements.

Id.
42. See About the Global Fund, GLOBAL FUND, http://www.theglobalfund.org/
en/about/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2011) (describing the organization’s mission of
preventing and treating diseases such as HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria).
43. See E.D. Report Provides Updates on CCMs, Round 8 Grants, Other
Topics, GLOBAL FUND OBSERVER (Aidspan, Nairobi, Kenya), Jun. 24, 2010, at 13-
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maintains tight control over purchases of particular tuberculosis and
malaria medicines.44 Will the Global Fund—and similar
funding/facilitating services such as those offered by UNITAID,45 the
Clinton Health Access Initiative,46 SCMS,47 IDA Foundation,48
Médecins Sans Frontières,49 and even UNICEF50—fear that their
14, available at http://www.aidspan.org/ documents/gfo/GFO-Issue-127.pdf.
[Principal Recipients] from 37 countries . . . have joined the Voluntary Pooled
Procurement (VPP) system. Discussions are ongoing with PRs from another 20
countries. The VPP has now registered 130 orders, with a total value of $335 million.
Ten countries have signed up for capacity building and supply chain management
assistance.

Id.
44. See THE GLOBAL FUND, GUIDE TO THE GLOBAL FUND’S POLICIES ON
PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY MANAGEMENT 12 (2009), available at
http://www.theglobalfund.org/documents/psm/pp_guidelines_procurement_supply
management_en.pdf (“All procurement of pharmaceutical products to treat
multidrug resistant TB (tuberculosis) must be conducted through the Green Light
Committee . . . .”); see also Affordable Medicines Facility - malaria (AMFm),
GLOBAL FUND, http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/amfm/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2011)
(describing the Affordable Medicines Facility – malaria, whose mission is to
expand access to effective malaria treatment through innovative financing
techniques that include tapping the public sector, private sector, and NGO’s).
45. See UNITAID, UNITAID CONST. § 1 (2007), available at
http://www.unitaid.eu /images/governance/utd_constitution_05-07_en.pdf (relating
that as part of the WHO, UNITAID’s express mission is to increase access to
HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria medicines by leveraging price reductions for
unaffordable treatments).
46. See Clinton Health Access Initiative - What We Do, CLINTON FOUND.,
http://www.clintonfoundation.org/what-we-do/clinton-health-access-initiative (last
visited Mar. 1, 2011) (summarizing the goals and purpose of the Clinton Health
Access Initiative, which include strengthening integrated health systems and
expanding access to treatment for diseases such as HIV/AIDS, malaria, and
tuberculosis).
47. See About Us, SUPPLY CHAIN MGMT. SYS., http://scms.pfscm.org/scms/
about (last visited Mar. 1, 2011) (recounting the mission and purpose of the Supply
Chain Management System, which includes reducing the costs of essential
medicines by encouraging its clients to buy in bulk and establishing long term
contracts with manufactures).
48. See IDA FOUNDATION, http://ida.nl/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2011) (describing
the mission and purpose of the IDA Foundation, which include utilizing its
resources to improve access to high quality medicines).
49. See Access to Essential Medicines: Ten Stories that Mattered in 2010,
MÉDECINS SANS FRONTIÈRES/DOCTORS WITHOUT BORDERS (Dec. 29, 2010),
http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/publications/article.cmf?id=4936&cat
=special-report (outlining Médecins Sans Frontières’ drug procurement activities
and vaccination campaigns).
50. See Supplies and Logistics, UNICEF, http://www.unicef.org/supply/index
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access-to-medicines resources and activities will be considered
intermediary services to third-party infringers whose medicines
might inadvertently violate a fictional in-transit patent rule, or an
opaque in-transit trademark confusion rule?51 Even further afield,
could a drug regulatory authority that registered a generic medicine
that later violated a fictional in-transit patent rule or an in-transit
trademark confusion rule also have been held liable for intermediaryservice infringement?52
Unfortunately, the switch to third-party enforcement, retained in
the latest ACTA text, does little or nothing to allay the potential risks
to access to generic medicines described above. One can still gather
information about third parties with respect to means of production
and distribution channels.53 One may still seek provisional orders and
permanent injunctions against third parties to prevent infringing
goods from entering channels of commerce, and in the case of
provisional measures, also temporarily enjoin other alleged acts of
infringement.54 Furthermore, the state may still impose criminal
sanctions against those who aid and abet criminal infringement
activities.55

.html (last updated Nov. 8, 2010) (describing UNICEF’s procurement of $1.75
billion worth of supplies from suppliers all over the world as an example of it
fulfilling its mission to ensure quality supplies reach children and their families).
51. Cf. THE GLOBAL FUND, supra note 44, at 12 (detailing The Global Fund’s
current requirements that recipients comply with “the policies of other
international funding sources” with regard to procurement of pharmaceutical
products). Ambiguity remains regarding possible new duties of the Global Fund to
double-check and confirm the intellectual property status of medicines purchases it
finances under international law (TRIPS Agreement), the law of the country of use,
and the law of every transit country as a result of intermediary enforcement
concerns.
52. See Effective Medicines Regulation: Ensuring Safety, Efficacy, and Quality,
POLICY PERSPECTIVES ON MEDICINES (World Health Org., Geneva, Switz), Nov.
2003, available at http://www.who.int/medicinedocs/pdf/s4921e/s4921e.pdf
(creating guidelines for drug regulatory authorities to assess medicines for quality,
safety, and efficacy and approve the medicine for marketing within a country). By
doing so, drug regulatory authorities would arguably enable the lawful distribution
and sale of alleged IP infringing medicines and thus be subject to intermediary
enforcement.
53. ACTA Text―Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 1, art. 11.
54. Id. arts. 8, 12.
55. See id. art. 23.4 (allowing for criminal liability of those who aid and abet
infringement activities).
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In particular, many uncertainties exist in the meaning and scope of
application of these provisions with respect to the concept of
entrance into the channels of commerce. Distributors and
transporters seem at particular risk as they may directly enable a
territorial infringement by transporting the infringing product or
content into the country of enforcement, thereby placing these
products squarely in the middle of channels of commerce where
territorial jurisdiction surely applies. Additionally, component
suppliers might also be liable under the provisional measures
provision since enjoining them as third parties could arguably
prevent the offending product from being made in the first place.56
Similarly, it is conceivable, though perhaps not as likely, that other
enablers of commercialization, including procurement agents like
Médecins Sans Frontières and the International Dispensary
Association; funders like PEPFAR, the Global Fund, and UNITAID;
and even drug regulatory authorities could also be temporarily
enjoined to prevent the commercialization and distribution of alleged
IP infringing products.57 Whether criminal “aiding and abetting”
extends to suppliers of subsidiary materials and other enablers, who
thereby contribute to either the production or commercialization of
the offending products, is perhaps less clear, but the possibility of
criminal liability58 is certainly troubling.
It is clearly possible that APIs and even inert ingredients can be
used in the manufacture of patent infringing products. Likewise, it is
possible that non-patent-infringing medicines might be intentionally
or misleadingly mislabeled so as to allegedly infringe a valid

56. See id. art. 12.1 (“Each Party shall provide that its judicial authorities have
the authority to order prompt and effective provisional measures . . . against a third
party . . . to prevent an infringement of any intellectual property right from
occurring, and in particular, to prevent goods that involve the infringement of an
intellectual property right from entering into the channels of commerce . . . .”).
57. See id. Third-party enforcement against these parties is less likely because
their role in enabling an IP infringing product to enter the channels of commerce is
much less direct than that of component suppliers, manufacturers, or distributors.
Nonetheless, the ultimate commercialization and movement of the product would
not occur were it not for their activities. A second reason that enforcement against
these parties is less certain is that jurisdictional reach to extra-territorial activities is
much less certain.
58. See id. art. 23.4 (authorizing criminal liability of those who aid and abet
infringement activities).
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trademark.59 In these circumstances and under TRIPS and
conforming national law, the right holder ordinarily would have full
recourse against the infringer in the country of manufacture and/or
the country of marketing and use.60 However, imposing a second tier
of liability on third-party suppliers and distributors who often lack
knowledge of the IP status of the product at issue is an undesirable
outcome. This second tier of liability would clog the channels of
commerce by requiring suppliers and shippers to double-check the
patent and eventual trademark status of all of their customers. In such
circumstances, suppliers and shippers might choose to boycott
generic manufacturers altogether rather than risk civil and perhaps
even criminal sanctions.
Certainly ACTA’s impact on access to medicines will be greatest
if its civil enforcement measures are used with respect to alleged
patent infringement. Health advocates therefore scored a victory
when the parties to the ACTA draft amended the border measures
provision to totally exclude patents and protection of undisclosed
information.61 Unfortunately, this exclusion does not prevent ACTA
members from unilaterally adopting patent-related border measures
such as those currently codified in EC 1383/2003.62 And in contrast
to ACTA’s border measures section, the civil enforcement section
stipulates that “[a] Party may exclude patents and protection of
undisclosed information from the scope of this [civil enforcement]
Section.”63 This permission to exclude leaves patents within ACTA’s
59. See generally Letter from Peter Maybarduk, Staff Attorney, Essential
Action, to Consultations and Liason Division, Anti-Counterfeiting Trade
Agreement, Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada 6 (July 2, 2009),
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/IPEC/frn_
comments/EssentialAction.pdf (explaining that deliberately mislabeled medicines
are within a subset of trademark infringing medicines which pose a risk to public
health).
60. See TRIPS pt. III, § 2 (outlining specific civil and administrative
procedures and remedies available to the IP right holder in a member’s
jurisdiction).
61. See ACTA Text―Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 1, art. 13 n.6 (excluding patents
from the scope of Article 13).
62. See Council Regulation 1383/2003, supra note 12 (authorizing the
detention of goods suspected of infringement on IP rights); supra notes 11-12 and
accompanying text.
63. See ACTA Text―Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 1, art. 6-7 n.2 (updating the text
from previous drafts, which read: “For the purpose of this Agreement, Parties
agree that patents do not fall within the scope of this Section”).
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mandatory civil enforcement rules unless a country actively chooses
to exclude. This presumptive inclusion could exert subtle pressure on
countries to include protection for patents and undisclosed data. The
presumption could also be the basis of pressure by powerful trade
partners for civil enforcement measures that extend to patents and
thus more directly threaten trade in generic medicines.
Moreover, ACTA will still allow border/customs enforcement
procedures by right holders and ex-officio at export, in-transit, and
import borders with respect to alleged trademark and copyright
claims.64 Patent-related seizures had previously been made based on
the in-country manufacturing fiction.65 Obviously these seizures
could have implicated third parties had ACTA’s border measures
provision not been changed to exclude patents.66 Although
trademark-related seizures have been fewer,67 a third-party API
supplier, procurement service, or shipper, could still be alleged to
have contributed to an eventual product that was misleadingly or
confusingly labeled. One plausible ground for mistaken assessment
of confusion might arise from the fact that both a brand name and
generic drug will display the required international non-proprietary
name (“INN”) for the active ingredient. Likewise, both the brand
name holder and the generic company might use portions of the INN
in their own brand names. In these circumstances, allegations of
actionable trademark confusion and of third-party liability could
arise. Similarly, to avoid confusion for consumers and to maintain
bioequivalence,68 the trade dress of a branded and generic medicine
64. See id. art. 13, n.6.
65. See Request for Consultations by India, European Union and a Member
State -- Seizure of Generic Drugs in Transit, WT/DS408/1 (May 19, 2010)
(requesting consultations over multiple European seizures of in-transit generic
medicines on alleged patent grounds, especially in the Netherlands, including one
case where AIDS medicines purchased by UNITAID were being shipped from
India to Nigeria).
66. ACTA Text―Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 1, art. 13 n.6.
67. See, e.g, Press Release, Health Action Int’l, Another Seizure of Generic
Medicines Destined for a Developing Country, This Time in Frankfurt (Jun. 5,
2009), http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/wp-content/uploads/2009/06/june-5-pressrelease-frankfurt-seizure.pdf (recounting an in-transit seizure by German customs
officials of generic Amoxicillin, en route from India to the Republic of Vanuatu,
because of alleged trademark confusion with GlaxoSmithKline’s off-patent brand
name medicine “Amoxil”).
68. See generally FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY:
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might also be appropriately similar but still trade-dress confusing.69
Once again, third parties might be held liable even under border
measures limited to trademark and copyright violations. Moreover, in
the unlikely event the trademark issue rose to the level of willful
trademark counterfeiting on a commercial scale, actions of thirdparty suppliers and distributors could constitute criminal aiding and
abetting. An innocent supplier for a producer, who later turned out to
be a willful counterfeiter, could suddenly be deemed a criminal
offender under Article 23.4 of ACTA.70

III. ACTA NEGOTIATORS ARE PURSUING
PHRMA’S ENFORCEMENT GOALS BOTH IN ACTA
AND IN TRADE AGREEMENTS
The European Commission, when releasing the April
Predecisional Draft, asserted that “ACTA will not hamper access to
generic medicines.”71 However, the analysis above shows otherwise.
Underlying health advocates’ fears, the Pharmaceutical Research and
STATISTICAL APPROACHES TO ESTABLISHING BIOEQUIVALENCE 2-4 (2001),
available
at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceCompliance
RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/ucm070244.pdf. Medicines are said to be
bioequivalent if generic versions have the same mode of administration (e.g., oral
capsule or tablet) and the same rate of absorption and elimination of the active
ingredient(s) in the human body as the original, previously registered product.
Bioequivalence tests merely require a so-called crossover study, involving a
relatively small number of human subjects, instead of the expense and delay of
duplicative Phase I-III clinical trials. Id. Because the size and shape of a medicine
can affect the bioequivalence of a generic medicine with its comparator, generic
manufacturers often need to make their medicine’s trade dress (appearance) close
to that of the originator. Although generic manufacturers should never affix a
trademark or to stamp a pill with the originator’s brand, the overall similarity of
appearance might reasonably confuse a customs agent.
69. See Sean Flynn, Note on ACTA and Access to Medicines, AM. U. WASH. C.
L. PROGRAM ON INFO. JUST. & INTELL. PROP., http://www.wcl.american.edu/
pijip/go/blog-post/note-on-acta-and-access-to-medicines (last visited Mar. 1, 2011)
(noting trademark confusion can occur when generic drugs are required to make
their labeling similar to brand name drugs).
70. See ACTA Text―Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 1, art. 23.4 (stating each party
shall ensure that criminal liability for aiding and abetting exists for certain
instances of trademark counterfeiting).
71. Press Release, Eur. Comm’n Directorate Gen. for Trade, AntiCounterfeiting Trade Agreement: European Commission Welcomes Release of
Negotiation Documents (Apr. 21, 2010), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/
index.cfm?id=552.

596

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[26:3

Manufacturers of America (“PhRMA”) advocates an even more
extreme and precisely defined application. In PhRMA’s comments to
the USTR on ACTA in 2008, PhRMA suggested that the Agreement
should explicitly impose intermediary liability on Internet Service
Providers and other operators, on entities that engage in parallel
trade, on suppliers of APIs and other bulk pharmaceutical
ingredients, and on distributors of generic medicines.
1. PhRMA Recommendation: Establish liability for Internet Service
Providers and Other Operators that Facilitate Trade in Counterfeit
Medical Products. “Expressly prohibit online activities that directly or
indirectly facilitate trade in counterfeit medical products and provide
legal incentives for ISPs and online intermediaries to cooperate with
legitimate manufacturers in combating counterfeiting activities. . . . We
note that Korea recently implemented a system for taking down web sites
selling counterfeits, and recommend examination of that system for
possible adaptation and use in other countries to combat online
counterfeit medicines.”
2. PhRMA Recommendation: Provide Effective Border Enforcement
against the Importation and Exportation of Counterfeit Medical Products.
“[W]ithout effective controls against diversion, parallel trade in
pharmaceuticals becomes a potential pathway for the introduction of
counterfeit medical products. ACTA members should also be required to
prohibit the distribution of medical products diverted from legitimate
distribution channels and such distribution of diverted products should be
treated as a counterfeiting offense.”
3. PhRMA Recommendation: Ensure that criminal and administrative
remedies extend to all upstream and downstream links in the drug
counterfeiting channel, including the supply of unauthorized bulk
chemicals and the distribution of finished counterfeit products. “Effective
anti-counterfeiting enforcement depends critically upon law
enforcement’s ability to block so-called chokepoints in the counterfeiting
manufacture and distribution channel, from the upstream supply of raw
materials to the downstream distribution of finished products. In the case
of counterfeit medical products, this holistic approach to enforcement
necessitates effective enforcement tools and remedies to stop the
unauthorized manufacture and supply (both domestic and international)
of the bulk chemicals used to produce counterfeit medical products, as
well as measures to prevent the unauthorized wholesale and retail
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distribution of counterfeit products.”72

Equally troubling is the fact that the U.S. and E.C. will not stop
with ACTA on their press for third-party enforcement; even before
ACTA, they enacted provisions requiring enforcement measures
against third parties. For example, in the EU/Colombia/Peru
Economic Partnership Agreement,73 there is an article on provisional
and precautionary measures, Article 232, that states: “Parties shall
provide that the judicial authorities may, at the request of the
applicant issue an interlocutory injunction against any party intended
to prevent any imminent infringement . . . .”74 Even more
problematic is Article 234’s footnote 64, which provides that
injunctions may be applied “against those whose services have been
used to infringe intellectual property rights to the extent they have
been involved in the process.”75 The meaning of “involved in the
process” is remarkably imprecise. Pursuant to the preceding analysis,
does it mean that an NGO buying allegedly infringing medicines will
not be able to deliver the medicines to its patients, or that a drug
regulatory authority can be enjoined from registering a medicine?

CONCLUSION
PhRMA and its ACTA negotiating surrogates have vigorous
ambitions that ACTA and other enforcement treaties be applied
upstream and downstream to manufacturing, supply, and distribution
channels to stop parallel and generic trade in medicines. Their tools
of preference include broad inclusion of IP rights, border/in-transit
measures, and ubiquitous injunctions that might interfere with
government use licenses and judicially-granted royalty schemes. Yet,
72. James Love, PhRMA Comments on ACTA: ISP Liability, Parallel Trade
and Generic APIs, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT’L (Jul. 10, 2008, 10:00 PM),
http://keionline.org/node/73.
73. Trade Agreement Between the European Union [and its Member States]
and Colombia and Peru, art. 232, initialed Mar. 23-24, 2011, available at
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=691 (follow “Preamble and
text of the agreement” hyperlink).
74. Id. art. 232 (emphasis added). This article could potentially be used against
NGOs or international medicines programs trying to deliver generics. However,
this possibility depends upon national legislation providing it, since the article
starts by saying “in accordance with their domestic legislation.” Id. States therefore
preserve their margin of maneuver.
75. See id. art. 234 n.64.
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PhRMA and its captive trade negotiators also want to use third-party
enforcement measures to dampen generic trade. The dangers to third
parties under ACTA are not limited to ISPs. Rather, the danger
extends to all who contribute to the supply, manufacture, registration,
procurement, and distribution of generic medicines that must go
through the choke-points of international trade, where ephemeral and
fictional patent and trademark-confusion rights might prevent the
cross-border trade of medicines lawfully produced in the country of
export and lawfully consumed in the country of import.
Although it is too late to stop the ACTA juggernaut, which has
reached its final stages,76 residual opportunities exist at the national
level to challenge the agreement substantively and procedurally.
Even if ACTA comes into force and is enacted in particular
countries, much can be done to exclude its application to patents and
undisclosed data, to corral its interpretation to minimize the reach of
third-party enforcement, to narrowly construe its jurisdictional grant,
to strictly define “entering into the channels of commerce,” and to
limit aider and abettor criminal liability. Health advocates must join
forces internationally to eliminate or reduce the risks to access to
medicines codified in the proposed ACTA text. Advocates can still
try to forestall ACTA’s approval at the national level and to narrow
and ameliorate provisions in implementing legislation that could
adversely impact supplier, distributors and enablers of generic trade
in low-cost generic medicines of assured quality.
However, the risk of intermediary service provider and third-party
enforcement efforts is not limited to ACTA itself. The E.C. is on
record that it hopes that ACTA will be adopted by other countries
"facing the same counterfeiting and piracy problems."77 Even more
ominously, although the mandatory application of enhanced
enforcement measures against patent- and data-infringing products
76. See ACTA Countries Finalize Agreement, Adopt U.S.-EU Compromise, 28
INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Nov. 19, 2010, available at 2010 WLNR 23073528
(confirming ACTA members have finalized the ACTA text and had resolved all
left over issues from the September round of negotiations); EU Parliament ACTA
Resolution Opens Doors to Final Approval, 28 INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Dec. 3, 2010,
available at 2010 WLNR 24009637 (reporting the passage of the non-binding
resolution by a 331-294 vote of the European Union parliamentarians).
COMMISSION,
77. Intellectual
Property:
Anti-Counterfeiting,
EUR.
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/trade-topics/intellectualproperty/anti-counterfeiting/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2011).
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was avoided in ACTA, PhRMA's intentions in this regard are clear.
Likewise, in bilateral trade agreements and Special 301 Watch List
annual reports, there remain many opportunities for the hydra-like
reappearance of full-blown intermediary or third-party enforcement.
Accordingly, advocates must maintain vigilance for a significant
time to come if these enforcement-related dangers to access to
legitimate generic medicines are to be avoided.

